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C·OMPETITIVE 
BALANCE IN 
MAJOR -LEAGUE 
BASEBALL 
by Matthew T. Jontry 
"When the Supreme Court says baseball 
un't run like a business, everyonejumps up 
and down with joy. When I say the same 
thing, people throw pointy objects at me. " 
-The late Bill Veeck, former 
owner ofthe Indians and White 
_ Sox 
I. INTRODUCTION AND mSTORY 
Major League Baseball is in trouble. The 
recent players' strike is just one in a series of 
player/owner problems that have beset this 
sport over the past century. Since the U.S. 
Supreme Court granted baseball owners 
exemption from the Sherman and Clayton 
Antitrust Acts in 1922, a constant and on­
going battle has been waged between owners 
and players on what is best for the competitive 
balance of the game, for the financial stability 
ofthe clubs, and for the welfare of the players. 
The problem centers around the structure of 
the labor market, which has ranged from the 
noncompetitive reserve system to the present 
day, highly competitive free agency system. 
According to the owners, with a growing crisis 
stemming from the unequal distribution of 
revenues among the clubs, the competitiveness 
of the labor market has a profound effect on 
the ability ofteams to field a competitive team 
and stay financially stable. 
Despite numerous challenges to the 
Supreme Court's landmark decision, the Court 
consistently held that baseball was exempted 
under current antitrust law. Many of the 
practices that baseball ownership engaged in, 
although challenged in the courts, 'had 
continued for years with little or no threat of 
reform. Two notable cases were Toolson v. 
The New York Yankees in 1953 and Flood v. 
Kuhn in 1972, in which the Court not only 
upheld the exemption, but also stated that the 
immunity would exist until ~ act of Congress 
removed or modified it (Markham and Teplitz 
1981,.. p.8). In 1977, the House Select 
Committee on Professional Sports issued a 
report that addressed this antitrust issue, but 
no legislation was initiated. To this day, no 
bill has made it out of both houses of 
Congress. 
One issue ofthe exemption that has drawn 
a great deal of attention over the years has 
been the reserve clause. In essence, this clause 
allowed owners to re-sign their players at 
whatever price they felt was appropriate, 
without fear of losing that player to a higher 
bid from another team. The only way a player 
could leave the club that originally signed him 
was either to be released or to be traded. 
There was no such thing as a free agent. The 
reasoning behind this clause was one of 
supposedly benevolent purposes. Owners 
were determined to protect the competitive 
balance in the game of baseball, and they felt 
that a purely competitive system in the labor 
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market (the players) would tip' the balance in 
favor of the more profitable clubs. Many of 
the labor disputes between the owners and 
players have resulted from this issue. 
A.	 SUCCESSFUL CHALLENGES TO 
THE RESERVE CLAUSE 
The first dent in the- owners' armor came 
in late December, 1975, when the old reserve 
clause was finally eliminated. However, 
owners still had the option of renewing a 
contract for one additional year after the 
original contract had expired. Still, research 
shows that compensation rose as did the 
number ofmulti-year contracts after the 1975 
decision (Hill and Spellman 1983, p.2). 
Another setback (from the owners' viewpoint) 
came with the new Major League Agreement 
signed in 1985. Faced with declining 
revenues and no strike insurance, the owners 
agreed to shorten the service requirement for 
free agency and salary arbitration eligibility. 
However, the owners were not to be undone 
and were detennined to stop the escalatin~ 
salaries that unrestricted free agency would 
bring. A basic, unspoken agreement was 
reached among the owners not to bid on any 
free agents. It is interesting to note that 62 
players filed for free agency at the end of the 
1985 season, and not one ofthem received an 
offer from any team other than the one they 
had played for during the 1985 season ( Quirk 
and Fort 1992, p. 197). All 26 owners must 
have been experiencing financial difficulties or 
have been extremely content with how their 
teams had performed that season. 
What ensued were three separate collusion 
grievances filed by the Player's Union, and all 
were found in their favor. Thus, the owners 
were facing an explosion of player salaries. 
One ofthe owners' oldest arguments for 
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A const~t and on-going 
battle has been waged 
between owners and players 
on what is best for the game, 
for the financial stability .of 
the clubs, and for the welfare 
of the players. 
preserving the reserve clause was to maintain 
a co~petitive balance among teams and to 
allow the smaller market teams to compete 
with the big market teams by retaining their ­
star	 players with smaller salaries or selling 
them for a considerable profit. The big 
market/small market argument is rooted in the 
reality that there are large differentials in terms 
of the revenue that each team generates. 
Whether it is due to population, fan support, 
or	 tradition has yet to be determined. In 
addition, whether the revenue differentials had 
anything to do with fielding a competitive 
team before free agency emerged is debatable. 
Research has shown that competitive balance 
actually increased after the emergence offree 
agency in 1976 (Zimbalist 1992, p.95). The 
~was ~ all owners were enjoying yearly 
Increases In fan attendance, lucrative revenue 
shares from the league's national television 
contract (CBS bought the network broadcast 
rights in 1988 for four years at the bargain 
basement price of $1 billion), and a steady 
. stream of revenue from licensing. 
B. THE PRESENT SITUAnON 
Presently, the state ofprofessional baseball 
does not look as healthy. Due to the hired­
gun mentality ofthe players and the scrambling 
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of owners to sign players with fan-drawing 
power, salaries have risen from a league 
average of $400,000 in 1989 to the present 
average of $1.2 million per player in 1994. 
Although these figures are not inflation­
adjusted, it is still a 300% increase over a five­
year period. The percentage oftotal revenue 
that owners spend on players' salaries has 
risen from 41% to 58%· over the same five­
year span ( The Economist, 13 Aug. 1994, 
59). Coupled with these increases is the 
diminishment of national television revenues. 
These revenues are split equally among the 
teams, and after CBS lost" an estimated $500 
million on its four-year deal that expired in 
1993, the networks weren't exactly lined up at 
the door to bid for the rights, and advertisers 
were not as anxious to pay top dollar for 
airtime during ball games. Hence, all the 
teams will realize a noticeable drop in 
revenues. This has a dramatic impact on the 
competitive balance, because the shared 
reveJ)~e ofa lucrative contract tended to assist 
the small market teams in becoming more 
competitive financially. Not only did it 
provide extra revenue for all teams, but it 
increased the exposure of the small market 
teams, enabling them to widen their markets 
and increase their fan appeal. Without the 
large national television contract, the small 
markets lose a vital resource in remaining 
competitive. The teams who will be able to 
bid on and sign the free agents and still remain 
financially afloat are the ones in big media 
markets with lucrative local cable TV 
contracts. This phenomenon is given no 
better illustration than when one compares the 
local media revenues of the most valuable 
franchise in the league, the New York Yankees 
(est. value: 5225 million), and one ofthe least 
valued franchises, the Seattle Mariners (est. 
value: 571 million). The Yankees annually 
receive about $50 million in local media 
revenues, while the Mariners' take is about $5 
million (Zimbalist 1992, p. 49). Yet both 
teams must compete in the same market of 
free agency. It seems like a difficult situation 
for clubs like the Mariners to field a 
competitive team. The distribution of total 
revenues has been made more unequal by the 
large differences in local media revenues. 
The purpose of this study is to reach a 
reasonable conclusion as to whether these 
factors (such as the revenue differences 
between big and small market clubs) have any 
bearing on the competitive balance of the 
league in terms of win-loss records. If a 
competitive imbalance is found, then it is 
useful to find the causes of this imbalance, 
possibly a comparative advantage for the big 
market teams in financing payrolls. Finally, we ­
must test whether this comparative advantage, 
if present, translates into more success (more 
wins) for the big market teams, on average, as 
compared to the average success of the small 
market teams. 
n. LITERATURE REVIEW 
On the surface, the mere structure of 
Major League Baseball seems to lend itself to 
general cartel theory. There are a limited 
nurrlber of firms. There is restricted entry, 
along with a division of territorial markets to 
which each club has "franchise" rights. In 
addition, the output (in this case, the number 
ofgames played) is limited to 162 per club per 
year. Yet, there is no price fixing agreement 
among the clubs for the final product, the 
game, nor is there currently a limit on the price 
of the primary factor of production, the 
players. This has led a few economists to 
believe that the seemingly collusive behavior 
that professional clubs and their owners 
engage in has a different motivation than 
extracting monopoly profits. Markham and 
Teplitz (1981, p.19) offered an explanation for 
this behavior. In a highly comprehensive study 
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done in anticipation of then forthcoming 
Congressional hearings, Markham and Teplitz 
pointed to the peculiarities of professional 
sports leagues in general and the baseball 
industry itselfas essential factors for collusive ' 
and cooperative behavior. The first was the 
trade-off between competitive balance and 
individual club·incentive. The success of the 
league (its ability to draw fans to the game or 
entice them to view it on television) depends 
on the competitiveness of the event. The 
public is more likely to attend a game that is 
evenly matched and that will provide an 
outcome that is unknown because it heightens 
their interest. On the other hand, there must 
be an incentive for the team to play well and 
exert a suitable effort to win games. To 
achieve the former condition, leagues have 
rules such as the reverse-order draft, where the 
least talented teams (according to winning 
percentage) in one year have the first 
opportunity to sign the best new players for 
the next season. The reserve clause, which 
allows teams to retain their own players 
without fear of losing them to a club offering 
more money, also seeks to maintain 
competitive balance. Activities such as these 
seek to equalize clubs over time, and add 
garity on a learly basis. 
As George Steinbrenner put
 
it, "It (how much to pay a
 
player) depends on how
 
many fannies he puts in the
 
seats," known more formerly
 
as marginal revenue product.
 
These measures seem to work, despite 
the relaxation of the reserve system's claim to 
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players over the past eighteen years due to the 
advent offree agency. Zimbalist (1992, p:95) 
points to the fact that over the time period of 
1975-1990, only three of the 26 teams failed 
to win their division at least once, that si~een 
different teams won the pennant in their 
respective league, and twelve different teams 
won the World Series. He also states that 
attendance has increased from a total of29.8 
million (1.24 million/club) in 1975 to 56.9 
million (2.19 million/club) in 1991. Ther~ 
seems to be some correlation between the 
balance of competition and the demand for 
baseball as an avenue ofentertainment. 
The incentive for victory is more difficult 
to quantify. Markham and Teplitz offered the 
explanation that the owners, players, and the 
community gain personal satisfaction and 
utility from winning, not necessarily financial 
gain. However, the winners ofDivisional and 
League Championships, as well as the World 
Series, receive a share of the revenue 
generated from those contests. The club 
receives a share, as do the individual players. 
In any case, there is an incentive to win ball 
games and to remain competitive as a club, but 
the long run vitality of the league as an entity 
also depends a great deal on a competitive 
balance. 
Not all theoretical analysis of Major 
League Baseball and professional sports in 
general are in their favor, however. Demmart 
(1973, p. 140) concluded that the long run 
success ofa tearn and its profitability depended 
on the strength of its market. He further 
believed that there would be a tendency for 
clubs located in strong markets (like New 
York and Los Angeles) to be both 
economically and sportingly superior to teams 
located in smaller markets (such as Pittsburgh 
and San Diego). He felt that the reserve 
clause was ineffective in eliminating long run 
inequality within the league, and that its only 
useful purpose was as a rent transfer 
mechanism from players to owners, assuring 
the economic viability of the league at the 
expense of player salaries. Demmart makes 
some other strong points, but his data and 
discussion are somewhat dated and irrelevant, 
since free agency was granted two years after 
his analysis was published. The fact ~hat parity 
exists after the advent of free agency in 1975 
and after further relaxation of free agency 
restrictions in 1985 is undisputed when one 
compares it to the reserve clause era of 1922­
1975. The level of competitiveness has 
increased. However, with the growing 
revenues of local cable contracts for the big 
market teams and a decline in revenues from 
the shares from the national broadcast 
contract, there is a possibility that the ability of 
small market teams to bid competitively for 
quality free agents (therefore making their 
teams more competitive) will be weakened. 
The effect of television revenues was 
something that neither Markham and Teplitz 
nor Demmart took into account in their 
analyses. They also did not foresee the 
explosion ofplayers' salaries that management 
experiences today. 
m. THEORETICAL DISCUSSION 
Much ofmy theoretical discussion will be 
based upon the work of James Quirk and 
Rodney Fort (1992), who used the standard 
applications of supply and demand law to the 
market for labor services in Major League 
Baseball. From the viewpoint ofanyone club, 
the most this club will offer a player for his 
services is the amount that this player will add 
to team revenues. As George Steinbrenner put 
it, ''It (how much to pay a player) depends on 
how many fannies he puts in the seats." This 
is more commonly known as the player's 
marginal revenue product, or MRP. It is a 
product ofmarginal productivity and marginal 
revenue. The MRP is the most the team will 
pay because paying more would reduce team 
profits, while paying less would increase team 
profits. The MRP is the maximum any player 
can expect to earn from the club. The 
minimum that he can expect to earn is called 
the reservation wage. This is what a player 
could expect to earn for his next .best 
employment opportunity, or the -..league 
minimum, whichever is higher. The MRP and 
the reservation wage represent the upper and 
lower bound, respectively, of what a player 
can expect to earn. Just how far apart these 
two extremes are depends on the degre"e of 
negotiation freedom between owners and 
players and the relative bargaining power of 
the two parties. The -more freedom for- . 
negotiation (under a free agency system, for 
example), the closer the MRP and reservation 
wage will be to one another. 
How does this theory apply to the 
negotiation process? Under unrestricted free 
agency, the bargaining will take place on its 
highest possible leve~ with owners and players 
free to negotiate with whomever they choose. 
Each player will end up signing with the team 
to which he is most valuable (where he. has the 
highest MRP). His salary will lie between this 
MRP and the player's MRP for the team to 
which he is the second-most valuable (his 
second highest MRP). The reasoning behind 
this is that the team to which the player-is most 
valuable can outbid any other team for the 
player's services, and still increase profits by 
hiring him. But the team must still offer him at 
least the MRP ofthe team to which he is the 
second-most valuable. This outcome can be 
summed up by the following relationship: 
MRP2 ~ SALARYJ: ~ MRP. 
where MRP. is the highest MRP that a player 
has for anyone team, SALARYE is the salary 
he can expect to be paid, and MRP2 is the 
second-highest MRP that a player has for any 
one team. 
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In an ideal situation, this process would 
equalize the teams' competitiveness. 
Assuming that each team could only attract so 
many fans per year (a sellout at each game), 
there would be limits as to how much a team 
could spend on payroll per year since revenues 
would be limited by attendance (ifone assumes 
stadium capacities of roughly equal size). 
There will be variability in ticket prices due to 
clubs facing shifting demand curves in their 
markets, but these will even out due to the 
cyclical nature of performance, which is 
affected by player depreciation, injuries, and 
~lainluck. 
According to Zimbalist, a 
"true sportsman" lies in the 
hearts of some owners, 
driving them to field a 
competitive team, no matter 
what the cost. 
However, we do not live in an ideal world, 
and the fact of the matter remains that there 
are owners who will pay more than a player's 
MRP. Why would an·owner do this? The 
most obvious reason may be that an owner has 
misjudged a player's worth. The player was 
not worth the money paid to him. An 
extension of this explanation could be that the 
owner was accurate in his assessment of the 
player's ability, but other variables (the change 
of venue, competitive pressure, injury, or 
complacency as a result of a lucrative, long­
term contract) may have a depreciating effect 
on his value to the team. 
Another e~planation stems from the fact 
that by buying the most talented players (even 
though their MRP's are lower than the salaries 
they are being paid), a team has benefited its 
own cause by depriving the other teams of 
those players' services. Put simply, a club can 
help its chances ofwinning, and, as a result, its 
chances of increasing demand for its product, 
by fielding the better team, man-for-man, 
position-by-position. 
Also, this practice may have the potential 
to realize future profits for the team in seasons 
to come. The future value of assembling an 
outstanding team now, regardless of current 
MRP's, may be the determining factor that 
causes owners to spend excess money on free 
agents. 
Finally, there is the explanation that some 
owners aren't worried about MRP's or the 
bottom line. According to Zimbalist (1992, p..._. 
94), a "true sportsman" lies in the hearts of 
some owners, driving them to field a 
competitive team, no matter what the cost. 
This argument is supported by the fact that 
many owners have other business interests, 
some much larger than their respective 
baseball franchise ownership. The loss of a 
few million dollars on the franchise's balance 
sheet might be more easily accepted if those 
other interests are profitable and the owner has 
the prestige and satisfaction of wimiing the 
Division, the Pennant, or the World Series. 
IV. HYPOTHESES 
Due to the rising salary levels of today's 
players, it is only a matter of time before some 
teams will be forced to dump high-priced 
talent and settle for fielding a less competitive 
team just to stay afloat financially. I attribute 
this problem to the big media market/small 
media market phenomenon in professional 
baseball. As was pointed out earlier, big 
market teams have a comparative advantage 
due to local cable revenues. Teams like the 
New York Yankees and the Chicago Cubs 
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either play in large geographic markets or are 
covered by a national cable station like WGN 
, and these resources give them a tremendous 
advantage over smaller market teams in 
bidding for top free agents every year. The • 
added revenues from these cable contracts and 
big market operations give them a cushion that 
allows their demand for top players to be 
greater, pennitting them to obtain more ofthe 
top players by being able to meet their salary 
demands. They will trade a portion of their 
huge profits for victories that could possibly 
generate even larger profits the following 
season. Thus, smaIl market teams will find the 
competitive balance tipping against them. 
I have formed three hypotheses. First, I 
test the hypothesis that since 19.B-6 (when free 
agency rules became dramatically unrestricted) 
there has been no improvement in the 
competitive imbalance ofprofessional baseball. 
Second, I test the hypothesis that big market 
teams, because of their comparative 
advantage, have a higher average payroll over 
the same period. Finally, I will test the 
hypothesis that the big market teams have been 
on the winning end of the competitive 
imbalance due to their comparative advantage 
in revenue. 
V. PROXY DERIVAnON 
The method I used to derive a proxy 
defining big market teams and small market 
teams was an OLS regression oftotal revenue 
generation. Utilizing media revenue data, 
stadium capacity utilization data, and a 
performance variable as independent variables, 
I derived an equation for total 'revenue 
generation. The media revenue and stadium 
cap~city data were found in Quirk and Fort's 
Pay Dirt: The Business ofProfessional Team 
Sports. The performance variable is the 
number ofdivisional championships each team 
has won since the advent of unrestricted free 
agency in 1985. This infonnation was 
provided by the World Almanac Series. 
Average total 'revenue for each particular 
team over the time period of 1987-1991 is the 
dependent variable (AVGTOT) in the proxy 
regression. Average total revenue is closely 
related to the ability of teams to finance their 
player payrolls from year to year. The first 
independent variable is average media 
revenues (AVGMED) of that same period. 
Media revenues are relevant to the 
hypothesized revenue differential of large 
market and small market teams. The second 
independent variable is average stadium 
capacity utilization (AVGCAP), which is 
derived by taking the average annual total 
_ attendance of a particular team and dividing 
that value by a product of stadium capacity 
and number of home games per season. This 
will give a ratio of actual fan patronage to 
maximum fan patronage, or, as we know it, 
stadium capacity utilization. This will give us 
an idea of how strong fan support is within a 
market and how it might affect average total 
revenue. 
The final independent variable used is a 
performance variable (AVGDIV). The actual 
success a team has had in recent years in 
winning divisional championships should have 
an effect on the amount oftotal revenue it can 
generate through fan support. The 
relationship between the dependent variable of 
average annual total revenue and the 
respective independent variables is described 
by the linear equation: 
AVGTOT = B1 +BJ(AVGMED) 
+BJ(AVGCAP) +B4(AVGDIVj 
where B. is the coefficient of the respective 
independent variable. The signs for each 
independent variable were expected to be 
positive, and all displayed a positive nature in 
the regression. The t-statistics for AVGMED, 
AVGCAP, and AVGDIV were 9.9276, 
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6.1045, and 1.8141, respectively. Thus, all 
independent variables where found to be 
significant to the 10% level, and the variables 
AVGMED and AVGCAP were significant to • 
a 1% level. Further proof of the adequacy fit 
of this model is evident in the adjusted R2 of 
the equation, which is .8916. 
In order to designate a market size for 
each respective ball club, I compared the 
actual average total revenue that each team 
had generated over the specified time period to 
the estimated average total revenue over the 
same period. The estimated average total 
revenue for each team was calculated by 
reinserting the media, capacity, and 
perfonnance data into the regression equation 
that was derived from these three variables. 
That is, I tested the regression equation to see 
how well it described the actual revenue data. 
My results were fairly accurate. Although the 
actual order ofteams and their revenue values 
were not identical to the regression equation's 
order and estimated revenue values, both 
populations showed the same 13 teams in the 
top 50% (big market designation) in tenns of 
-average total revenue and the same 13 teams 
in the lower 50% (small market designation). 
Thus, a reasonable proxy can be derived. For 
the pwposes ofmy hypotheses, the division of 
big market and small market teams is defined 
by the actual average total revenue. The top 
13 teams in terms of actual average total 
revenue are designated big market te~s, and 
the bottom 13 teams are designated small 
market teams. The breakdown of teams and 
their respective average total revenues are 
shown in Table 1 (see next page). 
VI. RESEARCH DESIGN 
To test my hypotheses, I will be using 
descriptive statistics and several graphs. My 
analysis uses salary data, in 1991 dollars, from 
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the period 1986-1991 as reported in Quirk and 
Forts' Pay Dirt: The Business of Professional 
Team Sports. The salary data for the years 
1992 and 1993 were obtained from the 
Chicago Sun-Times and the Chicago Tribune, 
respectively. I adjusted the 1992 and 1993 
salary data for inflation, using 1991 as the base 
year. My analysis also uses final records~f all 
teams from 1986-1993 as reported in various 
editions of the Information Please Almanac 
Series. Inflation rates for 1992 and 1993 were· 
also located in this source. 
VII. RESULTS 
A. FIRST HYPOTHESIS 
My first hypothesis was a test of the 
competitive balance ofMajor League Baseball. 
More specifically, I attempted to show that a 
competitive imbalance was still present, even 
after the relaxation of free agency rules in 
1985. The results from testing my first 
hypothesis show a competitive imbalance-in 
professional baseball when one analyzes the 
frequency distribution of WIL percentages 
over the period of 1986-1993. To measure 
competitive balance, I have used a two­
pronged approach. The first was an analysis 
of the standard deviation ofWIL percentages 
for all teams. Using the Noll-Scully approach' 
(Quirk and Fort 1992), one can evaluate the 
degree ofcompetitive balance in the league by 
comparing the actual values of standard ­
deviation for WIL percentage over a period to 
the idealized value of standard deviation, 
which is the standard deviation of WIL 
percentages for a league in which every team 
is of equal playing strength. In this idealized 
league, the chance ofwinning a game for every 
team is one-half in every game. Using the 
formula for standard deviation, the idealized 
value for a league with teams of equal playing 
strength is shown by the expression (.5)/N 1f2 . 
Table 1: 
AVERAGE TOTAL REVENUE (1987-1991) 
BIG MARKET 
TEAM VALUE($M) 
N.Y. YANKEES 94 
N.Y. METS 86.1 
TORONTO 83.1 
BOSTON 75 
L.A. DODGERS 71.65 
CHICAGO WHITE SOX 63.5 
OAKLAND 61.4 
ST. LOUIS 57.45 
CHICAGO CUBS 57.4 
TEXAS 55.9 
PHILADELPHIA 55.05 
KANSAS CITY 53.3 
BALTIMORE 52.3 
SMALL MARKET 
TEAM VALUE($M) 
CALIFORNIA SI.35 
S.F. GIANTS 49.45 
CINCINNATI 48.85 
SAN DIEGO 47.8 
DETROIT 44.8 
PITTSBURGH 43.45 
HOUSTON 43 
MINNESOTA 41.35 
SEATTLE 39.35 
MILWAUKEE 38.6 
CLEVELAND 38.4 
ATLANTA 37.85 
MONTREAL 37.4 
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where N is the number ofgames a team plays 
in a season. For a typical 162-game season, 
the ideal standard deviation will be 
(.5)/(162)lfl. This value becomes .03928, the 
standard deviation of WIL percentage for a 
perfectly competitive league. Measuring the 
average standard deviation for our eight year 
period, the value comes to .06334. A Chi­
Square test showed this to be a significant 
difference. A comparison of the observed 
standard deviations of WfL percentage with 
Noll and Scully's ideal standard deviation is 
shown in Table 2 (see next page). The Chi­
Square test ofthe significance ofthe difference 
between these two standard deviations is 
shown in Table 3. Hence, Major League 
Baseball has a significant competitive balance 
problem when one compares the actual 
standard deviation to the ideal standard 
deviation. These results are shown in Figure 
1. The idealized league would form a normal 
distribution (bell-shaped curve) around the 
hea~. solid line at the .500 WIL mark, with 
rougwy two-thirds of the WIL percentages 
coming within +/- 1 SD (the dashed lines). 
The increments on the x-axis each equal 1 
standard deviation. Visually, one can see the 
excess tail frequencies accounting for more 
than five percent ofthe WfL percentages. 
My . main contention was that the 
competitive imbalance had not improved since 
unrestricted free agency came in 1985. Due to 
insufficient data, I was not able to estimate the 
average standard deviation for the ten years 
(1976-1985) prior to my sample and compare 
the, two. However, Quirk and Fort did 
calculate the standard deviation for the periods 
of 1970-1979 and 1980-1990, and those 
values were .076 and .065, respectively. This 
shows a significant increase in the competitive 
balance during the transition years (1976-85), 
but it also shows no dramatic improvement 
through the unrestricted free agency era 
(1986-1993). I point to the comparison ofthe 
.065 SD of the 1980-1990 period with my 
calculated .06334 for the 1986-1993 period. 
It is important to notice that we overlap some 
years and that may affect the results. 
However, there is support for my first 
hypothesis that there has been no dramatic 
improvement in the competitive balance of 
Major League Baseball since the advent of 
unrestricted free agency in 1985. 
B. THE SECOND HYPOTHESIS 
My second hypothesis was that big market 
teams, because of their larger revenues, have 
comparative advantage in bidding for free 
agents. As a result, the average annual payroll 
for players' salaries should be higher for the 
big market teams. Using average annual salary 
data for each team from the period 1986-1991, 
I assumed a 25-man roster and found the total 
payroll for each team for each year in the 
period. While the salary data for 1986-1991 
were in 1991 dollars, the salary data for 1992 
and 1993 were nominal; therefore, I adjusted .­
these data for inflation, using 1991 as the base 
year. I then separated the big market teams 
from the small markets teams and found the 
average total payroll for each group for each 
year in the period. The results are shown in 
the graph in Figure 2. The big market teams' 
average total payroll was greater than the 
small market average total payroll in each year. 
One interesting thing to note about the graph 
is the tremendous increase in average payroll 
for both groups after the 1990 season. This 
may suggest a·new, higher range of salaries 
which may give the big market teams more of 
an advantage in the next few years. It is also 
interesting to note the plateau that exists in 
average payroll for both groups (especially for 
the big market teams) for the years 1986-1990. 
This may be explained by the collusive 
The Park Place Economist v.3 18 
Table 2: 
COMPARISON OF ACTUAL DISTRIBUTION OF WIL PCT. WITH IDEAL NOLL­

SCULLY DISTRIBUTION: 1986-1993
 
·ACTUAL ACTUAL 'IDEALN-S 
STANDARD FJiliQUENCY CUMULATIVE CUMULATIVE 
DEVIATION DISTRIBUTIoN DISTRIBUTION DISTRIBUTION 
~., 
+/- 1 44.23% 44.23% 66.7% 
+/- 2 35.09% 79.32% 95.0% 
+/- 3 14.90% 94.22% 99.9% 
Table 3: 
cm-SQUARE TEST OF ACTUAL AVERAGE STANDARD DEVIATION VS. IDEAL ­
STANDARD DEVIATION: 1986-1993 
Ho : .03928 (SD...)SDactuai = 
H.: SDactual > .03928 (SD-..) 
Reject Ho if X2 > 240.20 (5% significance level) 
538.25 > 240.20 
Therefore, reject Ho• 
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Figure 2: 
21 
agreements the owners had made not to bid on 
free agents during that period. I believe there 
was an attempt to keep players' salaries from 
escalating. 
I also tested the average salary differential • 
for significance using a Z-test, which evaluates 
the significance of a difference between the 
means of two populations. In this case, the 
two populations were the big market teams 
and the small market teams. The means were 
the average payrolls for each population. 
These results are shown in Table 4 (see next 
page). Four of the eight years showed a 
significant difference between the average 
payroll of the big market teams and the 
average payroll of the small market teams. 
Although the big market advantage was not 
significant in all years of the study, there are 
some trends could prove to validate the second 
hypothesis more conclusively in the future. 
The last three years showed a dramatic 
increase in average payroll for both groups, 
and the fact that the last two years show not 
only significant differences but increasingly 
significant differences may predict a larger 
gulf in the future between the big market 
payrolls and the small market payrolls. 
c. THE THIRD HYPOTHESIS 
Now that it has been established that there 
is a competitive imbalance. in the league and 
that the big market teams are using their 
comparative advantage to pay higher salaries, 
there is a need to find some correlation 
between the two. In other words, is the 
comparative advantage of big market teams 
translating into more average wins for them 
than for the small market teams? This test is 
easy to show, as it only requires comparing the 
average wins per year for each group. I 
summed the wins of all teams in each group 
for each year and divided by 13, the number of 
teams in the group. This gave me the average 
wins in a given ye~ for big market teams and 
the average wins in a given year for small 
market teams. A graphic, year-by-year 
comparison is shown in Figure 3. Once again, 
I tested the yearly difference of the averages 
for significance using a Z-test. The actual data 
and Z-test values are shown in Table 5. In 
every year but one (1992), the average wills of 
the big market teams were greater than the 
average wins of the small market teams.. 
However, the results do not show a significant 
difference in any year of our study. The 
closeness ofthe average wins between the two 
groups in the first three years may be 
attributed to a lag that may occur in signing 
free agents and assembling a competitive team. 
Also, the collusion among the owners may 
have had some effect on the relatively small 
differential between groups for the years 1986­
1989. The big market teams were not using 
there comparative advantage to its fullest 
extent. Ifwe recall the payroll plateau for the 
same period, there is substantial eviden"ce for 
this conclusion. Also the huge difference in 
the final year (1993) suggests that the 
comparative advantage is finally paying off It 
will be interesting to see the difference 
between the two groups over the next few 
years. In conclusion, the evidence does not 
show conclusive support for my third 
hypothesis. However, the final year of both 
the salary data and the average wins data show 
that small market teams may ,not be as 
competitive as the large market teams in the 
future. 
VIll. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY 
RECOMMENDAnONS 
The results of my tests seem to support 
two ofmy hypotheses very well. In terms of 
significance, my third hypothesis did not 
respond very well to testing, but the trends did 
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Table 4: 
AVERAGE ANNUAL SALARy DIFFERENTIALS: 1986-1993 
(1991 DOLLARS) 
YEAR BIG MARKET SMALL MARKET Z-TEST 
1986 
1987* 
1988* 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992* 
1993* 
Table 5: 
512,915,385 
513,528,846 
513,926,923 
514,571,154 
515,271,154 
524,057,692 
532,817,736 
533,562,300 
(* = 
511,967,308 
511,001,923 
511,244,231 
512,396,154 
514,794,231 
521,092,308 
525,735,440 
526,442,000 
significant to .05 level) 
0.7127 
2.2774 
2.1297 
1.5165 
0.3823 
1.3335 
2.4015 
2.9573 
AVERAGE ANNUAL WINS DIFFERENTIAL: 1986-1993 
YEAR BIG MARKET SMALL MARKET Z-TEST 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
82.38 
81.69 
81.23 
83.54 
82.54 
82.69 
79.31 
83.69 
79.31 
80.23 
80.15 
78.23 
79.38 
79.31 
82.69 
80.69 
0.7884 
0.3871 
0.2330 
1.4351 
0.9185 
0.3302 
0.8738 
0.6681 
(*= significant to .05 level) 
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Figure 3: 
FIGURE 3 
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raise some questions and legitimate concerns 
about what the future will hold for the small 
market teams. 
One of the main , ifnot the main, issues if 
the recent labor dispute between baseball's • 
management and its players has been the 
revenue gap between the big and small market 
teams. There have been a number .proposals 
brought to the negotiating table in an effort 
either to close this gap or to limit the annual 
payrolls ofeach team to a predetermined level. 
These measures are more commonly known as 
revenue-sharing and salary-capping. These 
two measures are primarily used hand-in-hand 
by other professional sports, such as the 
National Basketball Association. 
Under a revenue-sharinglsalary-cap plan, 
allleague revenues, or certain percentages of 
league revenues (local media revenues, for 
example), are pooled and divided equally 
among the teams. Obviously, this is an 
attempt to equalize the financing power ofall 
teams for player payrolls and basic club 
operations by providing them with 
comparable, if not identical, revenues. A 
certain percentage of these revenues are 
guaranteed to the players, thus creating the 
cap: each team has equal revenues, and an 
exact percentage ofthese revenues can be used 
for players' salaries. It is important to note the 
term can be used in the previous statement. 
Teams are not obligated to spend the 
maximum amount ofthe salary cap. However, 
just as there is a cap, there is a floor. Teams 
are forced (by the players' union, no doubt) to 
spend at least a minimal amount on players' 
salaries. Assuming all teams have equally 
competent general managers and scouts, talent 
would be distributed relatively equally among 
the teams by virtue of the salary cap and 
revenue-sharing. In tum, the competitive 
balance should improve due to this 
redistribution of revenue and talent, ceteris 
paribus. 
Despite the logical reasoning behind this 
plan, it would be very difficult to predict its 
effect. All things are not held equal; injuries ­
occur, poor scouting and drafting are present, 
and' pure luck is a large part of the game. 
However, we can see the effects a revenue­
sharing! salary-cap plan would have on total 
revenue distribution. Using the same variables 
utilized in deriving a big market/small market 
proxy, I was able to more equally distribute 
total revenue among the clubs when average. 
total media revenues were split equally among 
the clubs and entered back into a linear 
regression with the stadium capacity and 
performance variables. Although not 
conclusive, some support was given to the 
revenue-sharinglsalary-cap plan. 
Under the original league policy where 
teams keep all their own local media revenues 
and share national media revenues, the range 
of average annual total revenues was $56.6 
million (a maximum of $94 million and a 
minimum of $37.4 million). The standard 
deviation was approximately $15.42 million. 
By comparison, according to the revenue­
sharing regression, sharing media revenues 
would reduce the range to $40 million and the 
standard deviation to only $11 million. Both 
of these figures are improvements in terms of 
making average annual total revenue "more" 
equal. 
There are some problems with the 
revenue-sharinglsalary-cap plan, however. 
First of all, trying to limit players' salaries is . 
always difficult to do. From a self-interest 
perspective, players are reluctant to do 
anything that would decrease their incomes, or 
more appropriately, their future incomes. 
Second, just as it is difficult to police cartel 
output and price restrictions, it is also difficult 
to police big market teams whose marginal 
cost, under a salary cap plan, could quite 
possibly be below their marginal revenue. In 
other words, by the sheer size of their market, 
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there may be opportunity and incentive for big 
market teams to invest more in players' 
salaries in order to maximize profit. On the 
other end ofthe spectrum, there may be times 
(though seldom) that small market teams 
experience having the required minimum 
payroll above their marginal revenue curve. 
Thus, there is a disincentive to field a 
competitive team. An example of this 
occurred recently. The Montreal Expos held 
a fire sale on their most talented players before 
the start ofthe 1995 season, even though they 
had one of the lowest payrolls in 1994. 
Management for the Expos cited financial 
problems as the reason. 
A fourth concern is the ability of 
management to manipulate the salary cap in 
their favor. By staggering the bulk payments 
of lucrative contracts in alternating years to 
different high-priced stars, teams can 
essentially beat the salary cap. Also, teams 
t~nd to extend "bonus" incentives to players 
that are not reported as raw salary, but 
because they can be obtained rather easily, 
these bonuses could be counted as guaranteed 
salary. 
Finally, some would argue that the fact 
that teams would be equalized financially does 
not necessarily mean they will be equalized 
competitively. Indeed, the results from my 
third hypothesis test showed no conclusive 
evidence that more revenue and higher salaries 
translates into more wins. Also, the ~ational 
Basketball Association, owners of the most 
comprehensive revenue-sharing!salary-cap 
plan in professional sports, actually had the 
worst competitive imbalance problem of the 
four major professional sports of baseball, 
football, basketball, and hockey (Quirk and 
Fort 1992, p. 293). 
In any case, the fact that enormous 
revenue differentials exists between big market 
teams and small market teams has been proven 
and is without debate. Also, there is some 
evidence that a revenue-sharinglsalary-cap 
plan would equalize teams financially. But the 
argument that a cap on salaries would also 
solve the competitive imbalance of Major 
League Baseb~l is inconclusive. 
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